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BLUE-SKY MERIT REGULATION: BENEFIT TO
INVESTORS OR BURDEN ON COMMERCE?
Roberta S. Karmel*
INTRODUCTION
All fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico
have a securities regulation statute, called a blue-sky statute.
Some are merit regulation statutes, and some are not. Merit reg-
ulation gives a state, through its blue-sky commissioner, the au-
thority to prevent an issuer from selling its securities in that
state when the offering or the issuer's capital structure is sub-
stantively unfair or presents excessive risk to the investor.' State
blue-sky regulation of securities offerings have co-existed with
federal securities regulation without much question or examina-
tion for over fifty years. In some cases, federal and state regula-
tory interests have been harmonized and coordinated so that in-
vestors enjoy greater protection without an undue burden being
placed on capital formation. Nevertheless, there has been regula-
tory duplication that is confusing and costly to investors.
Despite increasing coordination between federal and state
regulators, and a widespread political shift favoring deregula-
tion, the dual regulatory system with its state-imposed merit
regulation component has changed little since 1933. However,
federal securities regulation and the securities markets have
changed considerably. Moreover, some of the traditional con-
cerns of blue-sky commissioners relating to fair and equitable
capital structures have emerged as matters of national concern,
generally in the context of battles for corporate control of large
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Partner, Kelley Drye & Warren; Director,
New York Stock Exchange, Inc.; Former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Com.
mission (1977-80); B.A. Radcliffe College; LL.B. New York University School of Law. A
summer research stipend from Brooklyn Law School is gratefully acknowledged as of
assistance in the preparation of this article. Brooklyn Law School students Gregory Fara-
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search for this article.
I Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings by the Ad Hoc Subcom-
mittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities Committee, 41 Bus.
LAw. 785, 787 (1986) [hereinafter ABA Report].
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public companies. Many commentators, therefore, have begun to
take a critical look at merit regulation and question its effect on
capital formation.2
Merit regulation clearly imposes burdens on capital forma-
tion.' The question is whether the costs added to the underwrit-
ing process by blue-sky compliance outweigh whatever benefits
blue-sky laws provide to investors or the securities markets.'
The serious, ongoing philosophical and political debate about
the value of state merit regulation, which dates back to the early
twentieth century,5 suggests that while some degree of regulation
as to the fairness of securities offerings is perceived to be in the
public interest, the continuation of individual state standards
for determining the worthiness of an offering should generally
give way to a uniform federal standard promulgated by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or by securities self-
regulatory organizations (SROs).
The internationalization of the securities markets and the
need for United States' interests to compete effectively in those
markets is another reason for the development of a uniform na-
tional standard at this time. Such a standard should be in ac-
cord with the basic principle of federal securities regulation "to
protect the public with the least possible interference to honest
business."' While this is usually accomplished by selecting dis-
' See, e.g., Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill, 15
WAYNE L. Rlv. 1447 (1969); Campbell, An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky
Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553 (1985); Dumont, The Case for States to Abolish "Merit
Review" of New Offerings, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 20, 1985, at 1, col. 3; Mofsky & Tollison, De-
merit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 367 (1977). These and other critics have
generated articles in defense of merit regulation. See, e.g., Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is
There Merit in the Merit Requirements?, 1976 Wis. L. Rnv. 79 (1976); Warren, Reflec-
tions on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C.L. REv. 495
(1984). See also Brandi, Securities Practitioners and Blue Sky Laws: A Survey of Com-
ments and a Ranking of States by Stringency of Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 689 (1985);
Makens, Who Speaks for the Investor? An Evaluation of the Assault on Merit Regula-
tion, 13 U. BALT. L. Rv. 435 (1984).
3 See ABA Report, supra note 1, at 845-47.
4 One obvious burden imposed by merit regulation is the significant legal fees for
counsel who perform the blue sky survey provided to the underwriters. Filing fees, print-
ing costs, and other expenses also are high. A less obvious but very real cost is the delay
and uncertainty that is imposed on the underwriting process. In addition to such mone-
tary costs, merit regulation constrains the freedom of issuers, underwriters, and investors
to contract to allocate the risks and rewards of business enterprise.
L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcwuTiEs REGULATION 29-38 (1983).
6 President Roosevelt's message to Congress recommending the passage of the Se-
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closure rather than substantive standard setting as a regulatory
method, it is unlikely that a national standard can be developed
without some attention by the SEC to qualitative governance
standards.
A uniform federal regulatory standard can be achieved ei-
ther by federal-state cooperation or by federal preemption. Co-
operation is politically preferable and has been suggested by
Congress in the 1980 amendments to the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act).7 Nevertheless, in view of the continuing com-
mitment of many states to merit regulation, stronger action may
be necessary to achieve a uniform standard. In addition, the
SEC must accept responsibility, either directly or with the assis-
tance of SROs, for formulating such national standards as may
be necessary and appropriate to maintain investor confidence in
the public securities markets if state merit regulation is
abolished.
This article argues that state merit regulation is a burden
on interstate commerce and stands as an obstacle to the achieve-
ment of the SEC's statutory goals of facilitating capital forma-
tion and the establishment of a national market system (NMS). 8
Further, the basic philosophical conflict between federal and
state regulation will become increasingly troublesome as the
SEC grapples with the problems of regulating the market for
corporate control of large public companies and participating in
the regulation of international capital markets.
I. Tm DUAL REGULATORY SYSTEM
The federal-state-SRO system of securities regulation does
not have a well articulated allocation of responsibilities and pri-
orities. It involves conflicting philosophies and considerable
overlap and duplication. Although Congress may not have in-
tended that the federal securities laws eliminate state blue-sky
regulation, it is not clear that Congress "had any systematic un-
derstanding of what the relations of state and federal securities
curities Act, reprinted in LEGISLATInV HSTORY OF THE FEanaL SECURITIES Lws, at 20
(1983).
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) (1982).
a For a further discussion of these SEC mandate3, see It KARLIL. REGULATioN By
PROsEcuTioN: THE SEcuIrEs & E CHA2NGE CoMIssIoN vERsus CoRPoxrAE AaER cA 101-
38, 295-339 (1982).
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regulation should be, how regulatory responsibilities should be
allocated, or how federal disclosure regulation and state merit
regulation should be accommodated to each other."'
A. Constitutional and Statutory Framework
Blue-sky merit regulation may be invalidated under either
the supremacy or commerce clauses of the United States Consti-
tution. Such invalidity can result from (1) the preemption of
state blue-sky law under the supremacy clause or (2) a determi-
nation that blue-sky statutes constitute an undue burden on in-
terstate commerce which contravenes the commerce clause.
In deciding whether the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion requires that federal law preempt a state statute, the courts
look to the intent of Congress. Preemption may be compelled
whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the language
of a statute or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.
An analysis of the relevant statutes demonstrates that in gen-
eral, Congress did not intend to preempt state blue-sky laws
when it enacted the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).
Section 18 of the Securities Act provides: "Nothing in this
Subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commis-
sion (or any agency or office performing like functions) of any
State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Co-
lumbia, over any security or any person." 10 The legislative his-
tory of this provision is sparse. However, it is known that the
initial securities act bill, which passed the House, set forth a
clause prohibiting the sale of securities in interstate commerce
into any state if such sale would have violated the blue-sky laws
of that state."1 The stated purpose of this prohibition was "to
assure the states that the [Securities Act] was not an attempt to
supplant their laws, but an attempt to supplement their laws
and assist them in enforcing their laws in cases where they have
no control. 1 2 This clause was later deleted by Senate amend-
9 ABA Report, supra note 1, at 793.
10 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1982).
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933).
' Securities Act Hearings on H.R. 4314, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (Statement of
Ollie M. Butler).
[Vol. 53: 105
BLUE SKY REGULATION
ment.13 The present version of section 18 of the Securities Act
replaced it, and has never been altered.
Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act is similar to section 18 of
the Securities Act. It provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any
State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict
with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder.
4
Section 19(c)(3)(C) of the Securities Act provides that
"[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing
preemption of State law.' " 5 This provision was added to the Se-
curities Act by the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of
1980,16 and would appear to be limited to the 1980
amendments.
Although the foregoing provisions indicate a congressional
intent not to preempt state blue-sky law generally,", such sav-
ings clauses do not necessarily prevent the Supreme Court from
declaring state securities laws unconstitutional. Absent an ex-
press statutory preemption, federal law will preempt state law
where a direct conflict exists between particular provisions of
state law and federal law, making compliance with both laws a
13See KI. REP. No. 152, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
14 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
15 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(3)(C) (1982).
" Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2292 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(3)(C) (1932)).
The Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 was enacted to encourage greater
uniformity and simplicity of federal and state securities regulation. S. Rzs. No. 958, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43 (1980).
'7 Professor Warren, who sets forth a thorough and eloquent argument against pre-
emption, see Warren, supra note 2, explains that this savings clause was included in a
statute requiring federal and state cooperation to achieve greater uniformity in securities
regulation, in the face of industry clamor for preemption of state regulation and the use
of the threat of preemption by at least one SEC Commissioner to achieve the goal of
uniformity. Id. at 499-500, 523-24. While this general congressional reafirmntion of a
dual regulatory system was perhaps necessary to prevent the SEC from using section
19(c) of the Securities Act to support generalized rule-making to preempt state securities
law, I do not believe that it prevents limited, implied repeal of blue-sky merit regulations
that conflict with the federal securities laws. Cf. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 463 US. 85
(1983) (ERISA preempts state law insofar as state law prohibits practices that are laIful
under federal law;, complete preemption would frustrate goals of joint federal-state en-
forcement of federal law).
" See Smith, State "Blue Sky" Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 34 MIcI. L
Rv. 1135, 1160 (1936).
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"physical impossibility,"19 or where an area of law is so perva-
sively regulated by a complex federal statutory scheme that
state regulation "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."20
In addition to being invalidated due to federal preemption,
state legislation can be declared invalid under the commerce
clause. Legislation will be invalidated under the commerce
clause if it imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is ex-
cessive in relation to the local interests served.2 1 In many in-
stances, state blue-sky regulations impose burdens on interstate
commerce. While these burdens are somewhat justifiable be-
cause a state may have a legitimate interest in capital invest-
ment or financial services within its borders, regulation that ef-
fectively impedes the interstate capital markets is invalid. 2
B. Case Law
The constitutionality of state blue-sky laws was first tested
in three Supreme Court cases decided in 1917, sixteen years
before the first federal securities law was enacted. 8 While a vari-
ety of constitutional arguments were raised in these cases, the
cases particularly focused upon the possible limitations imposed
by the fourteenth amendment on the power of a state to prevent
fraudulent securities issuances. Only one of the opinions, how-
ever, specifically discussed the contention that the blue-sky laws
burdened interstate commerce. In Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.,
24
the Court upheld the blue-sky statute under review on the
ground that the statute was only applicable to dispositions of
securities within the state and, thus, could not burden interstate
commerce. The Court found that
'9 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
20 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978) (quoting Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977).
21 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
22 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (Alabama domestic pref-
erence tax statute violative of equal protection clause); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447
U.S. 27 (1980); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). Now
Chief Justice Rehnquist may have a higher tolerance for balkanized economic regulation
than any other member of the Court. See Fein, Rehnquist Proven to be Big Booster for
Business, Legal Times, July 28, 1986, at 12, 13.
23 See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
24 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
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[u]pon their transportation into the State there is no impediment -
no regulation of them or interference with them after they get there.
There is the exaction only that he who disposes of them there shall be
licensed to do so and this only that they may not appear in false char-
acter and impose an appearance of a value which they may not pos-
sess - and this certainly is only an indirect burden upon them as
objects of interstate commerce, if they may be regarded as such.'
This reasoning clearly suggests that in-state corporations that
participate in purely local financing ventures are subject to blue-
sky merit regulation and that blue-sky merit regulation limited
to intrastate issuances is valid. It remains an open question,
however, whether this reasoning would insulate blue-sky merit
regulation that has the effect of compelling an out-of-state cor-
poration, which has registered an offering with the SEC and
made the full disclosure required by federal law, to change its
capitalization in order to syndicate a securities offering
nationally.
It was not until the 1982 case of Edgar v. MITE Corp.20
that the Supreme Court held a state securities regulatory statute
- the Illinois takeover law - inconsistent with the United
States Constitution. The Court explained that its traditional ra-
tionale for upholding state blue-sky laws against commerce
clause invalidity "was that they only regulated transactions oc-
curring within the regulating States .... ,27 The Court stated,
however, that the Illinois regulatory scheme went beyond regu-
lating intrastate transactions.
The rationale of allowing blue-sky merit regulation due to
its local nature may have made sense prior to the adoption of
the federal securities laws and the development of a mature na-
tional securities marketplace. Further, it may continue to be uti-
lized to enable the states to engage in certain types of truly in-
tra-state blue-sky regulation. However, MITE suggests that
blue-sky merit regulation may be vulnerable to constitutional at-
tack if it denies an out-of-state issuer (which registers securities
15 Id. at 557-58.
26 457 U.S. 624 (1982). There were six separate opinions issued in this ca-se, and a
majority found only that the state law imposed an indirect burden on interstate com-
merce. A plurality of Justices found direct burdens on commerce, and another plurality
found preemption of the state law by the Williams Act, which in 1968 amended the
Exchange Act by regulating tender offers.
" Id. at 641 (citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917)).
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with the SEC in order to effectuate a nationwide offering) access
to the capital market in the state because of perceived deficien-
cies in that issuer's capitalization. In other words, if the local
interests served by merit regulation are balanced against the na-
tional interest in the efficient allocation of economic resources in
connection with the capital formation process, there may not be
a sufficiently significant difference between the Illinois takeover
law declared invalid in MITE and blue-sky statutes that enable
a state commissioner to block an offering that is not deemed fair
and equitable.
While the MITE Court expressly distinguished the Illinois
takeover law from general state blue-sky laws, the viability of
this distinction is problematic. In most instances, the reasoning
that the Court used to strike down the Illinois takeover statute
can be applied to blue-sky merit regulation in general, thus
making the constitutionality of such statutes questionable, and
reducing the viability of the Court's distinction between the two
types of statutes.
A plurality of Justices in MITE felt that the policy of neu-
trality between tender offerors and targets articulated in the
Williams Act was offended by the pro-target tilt of the Illinois
takeover law. Similarly, perhaps a majority of the Court could
be persuaded that the policy of free access to the capital mar-
kets, conditioned only on the full disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws, is offended by, and therefore preempts,
state law that presumes to pass on the merits of an offering and
denies access to the capital markets to an issuer that does not
meet a fair and equitable offering test. Alternatively, the Court
could find that the burden placed on commerce by state merit
regulation outweighs the benefits of local investor protection.
Two post-MITE cases raised questions of the constitution-
ality of blue-sky merit regulation, but neither case squarely de-
cided the issue. In North Star International v. Arizona Corp.
Commission,28 the Ninth Circuit upheld the application of Ari-
zona's merit review of an intrastate offering. Although the appel-
lant advanced the argument that Arizona's merit review was in
fundamental conflict with the disclosure provisions of the Secur-
ities Act, the court never reached the merits of this issue due to
28 720 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1983).
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deficiencies in the complaint.
Carney v. Hanson Oil Co. 29 involved a suit for rescission by
a purchaser of oil and gas interests which were not registered
under a Missouri blue-sky statute. The defense included chal-
lenges to the state statute on preemption, equal protection and
commerce clause grounds. The Missouri Supreme Court held
that there was no conflict between the Missouri statute and the
federal securities laws and that the state law did not unduly
burden interstate commerce. However, this case involved no ef-
fort to comply with state law, and it was not clear that there was
federal law compliance.
In summary, since the federal securities laws were passed,
no case has reached the United States Supreme Court that
squarely raised the question of whether state merit regulation
conflicts with the free access to the capital markets provided by
federal law to any issuer that makes the required full disclosure
about its financial affairs, and whether, therefore, state merit
regulation statutes should be deemed to be preempted. Neither
has there been a case that considered whether such regulation,
especially in the context of international securities markets, is
an excessive burden on commerce in relation to the local inter-
ests protected. Nevertheless, a sound legal basis exists for con-
stitutional challenges to state merit regulation, and if the SEC
should begin to exercise plenary rule-making authority to
achieve a national uniform standard in certain areas of security
regulation, such constitutional challenges may be successful.
C. The Role of the SROs
Complicating the usual difficulties of a dual regulatory sys-
tem is the unique role of the SROs in securities regulation. Indi-
vidual stock exchanges and the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers, Inc. (NASD) are industry membership
organizations which operate under the aegis of the Exchange
Act. In addition to requiring their members to comport with
high standards of commercial conduct in their dealings with cus-
tomers and one another, the exchanges have enforced various
corporate governance mechanisms on public companies through
their listing agreements. For this reason, they are called self reg-
"690 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1985).
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ulatory organizations. In part because of the New York Stock
Exchange's (NYSE) requirements for listing, which give inves-
tors protection over and above the federal securities laws, most
states have a "blue chip" exemption from the coverage of blue-
sky laws for exchange listed securities.30 However, marketplace
and legal developments have generated competition for listings
between the NYSE, other exchanges, and the over-the-counter
NASDAQ market; this competition may undermine the ability
of the NYSE to maintain higher listing standards than other
marketplaces.3 1 As a result, the merit regulation states are tak-
ing a critical look at the "blue chip" exemption.
Since 1975, the SEC has had both more power and more
responsibility concerning SRO rule-making than previously was
the case. Accordingly, despite the selection of disclosure over
substantive regulation in the Securities Act, the SEC could well
exercise merit regulation under the authority given to it by Con-
gress to establish a national market system (NMS) 2
In the amendments to the Exchange Act, which laid the
foundation for the NMS, two significant new powers were given
to the SEC: the power to approve, disapprove, abrogate, add to
or delete from rules of SROs;ss and the power to "designate the
securities . . . qualified for trading in the national market sys-
tem" (qualified securities).3 4 The SEC's authority to regulate the
rules of SROs is limited to actions in "furtherance of the pur-
poses" of the Exchange Act. 5 Further, any amendments to any
SRO rules that are mandated by the SEC remain rules of the
30 ABA Report, supra note 1, at 833-35. Fifteen states have such an exemption:
Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming.
31 See generally Karmel, The SEC's Power to Regulate Stockholder Voting Rights,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
31 In 1975 Congress laid the foundation for the establishment of the NMS in amend-
ments to the Exchange Act. Without mandating specific components of the NMS or even
defining the term, Congress vested the SEC with broad flexible authority to design, im-
plement and regulate the NMS. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.). The goal in establishing the NMS was "to assure that the country
maintains a strong, effective and efficient capital raising and capital allocating system in
the years ahead." S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975) [hereinafter SENAT
REPoRT].
Securities Exchange Act §§ 19(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b)-(c) (1982).
3" Securities Exchange Act § 11A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1982).
'5 Securities Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982).
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SRO and do not become SEC rules.:" The SECs authority to
establish criteria for "qualified securities" is not limited on the
face of the statute, except implicitly by the objectives of the
NMS. One of these principles is that whether a security is quali-
fied to be included in the NMS should depend primarily on its
trading characteristics rather than where it happens to be
traded. The Senate Report, for example, noted that "many se-
curities do not have the characteristics - e.g., trading, volume,
price, and number of stockholders - which would justify auc-
tion-type trading. '37 Also, one of the statutory findings added to
the Exchange Act of 1975 is that it is "in the public interest and
appropriate for the protection of investors and the maintenance
of fair and orderly markets to assure... fair competition...
among exchange markets, and between exchange markets and
markets other than exchange markets. 35
In giving the SEC authority to define "qualified securities",
it would appear that Congress intended that the SEC could
equalize listing standards of competing marketplaces. To the ex-
tent that such traditional standards are qualitative and relate to
some matters that are covered by state merit statutes, the SEC
may have an untapped capacity to establish national merit stan-
dards. However, due to the general principle that the federal se-
curities laws were not intended to federalize state corporate
law,39 some commentators have questioned whether the SEC can
validly exercise this untapped capacity to establish national
merit standards.40 In answer to this, it should be noted that the
SEC has frequently and successfully established national stan-
dards regarding certain aspects of corporate finance that go be-
yond state corporation law.41
36 Securities Exchange Act § 19(c)(4)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)(4)(C) (1982).
nSENATE REPoRT, supra note 32, at 16.
33 Securities Exchange Act § 11A(a)(1)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. 78A(k)(1)(C)(ii) (1982).
39 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
40 Compare Dent, Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54
GEo. WAsm L Rxv. 725 (1986), with Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting
Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GE'o. WAsIL L Rnv. 687
(1986).
41 SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE AccouNTAsuvT, SENATE Cow.J ON BNIuNO.
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIrS, 642-47 (Comm. Print 1980).
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II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN MERIT REGULATION AND FEDERAL
REGULATION
Because of the "blue chip" exemption, merit regulation ap-
plies primarily to initial public offerings of equity securities.
While merit regulation is not necessarily antithetical to disclos-
ure regulation, a merit regulator does have the capacity to di-
rectly intervene to require changes in the internal structure of a
securities issuer, the relations among insiders and outsiders, and
the terms of the offering.' The merit regulator acts as a negotia-
tor in getting a better deal for investors. Although this role is
justified as necessary to prevent overreaching and to bolster in-
vestor confidence,'43 it is a form of price and profit regulation,
which can be criticized as a paternalistic interference with mar-
ket forces which inhibits capital formation by discriminating
against start-up firms and new technologies." The purpose of
this article is not to repeat the claims of defenders and detrac-
tors of merit regulation, but to suggest points of conflict between
federal securities regulation and state law. Annexed as Table I is
a chart setting forth the states that have the kinds of merit re-
strictions discussed below.
A. Price and Profit Regulation
1. Offering-Price Restrictions
Twenty-one states regulate the price at which a new unsea-
soned issuer can offer its stock to the public.45 These restrictions
are set forth in a variety of ways, such as setting the offering
price as a multiple of the company's book value,'0 or comparing
the multiple of the offering price to earnings to that of similar
public companies.47 Closely related to offering-price restrictions
42 ABA Report, supra note 1, at 823.
41 Id. at 829.
" Brandi, supra note 2, at 698; Campbell, supra note 2, at 565; Dumont, supra note
2, at 4.
45 H. SOWARDS AND N. HIRSCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS - BLUE SKY REGULATION §
7A.02[2] (1986 & Supp. Nov. 1986). See Table I of this article.
46 E.g., FLORIDA SECURITIs RULE 3E-700.15(2)(a), 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1
17,485, at 13,433.
47 E.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 3AAC 08.140(b)(3), 1 BLUE SKY L. REI'. (CCH)
1 8427 at 4422; CALIF. ADMIN. CODE, Rule 260.140.50(b), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1
11,901, at 7669; Mo. REV. STAT. § 30-52.050(2)(c), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 35,455, at
30,528.
[Vol. 53: 105
BLUE SKY REGULATION
are restrictions against excessive dilution, which prohibit a large
disparity48 between the price of the stock purchased by insiders
or promoters and the price of the stock sold to the public.0
The SEC focused on this type of dilution in the value of the
common stock being sold to public investors at a fairly early
date. However, the SEC determined that as long as full disclos-
ure of these facts was made to investors, it was not within the
prerogative of the Commission to prevent a financial product
from coming to the marketplace. 0 Yet the state merit regula-
tions regarding dissolution do just that. However, neither the
SEC nor any court has gone so far as to say that the congres-
sional determination not to impede capital formation by requir-
ing securities offerings to pass a fair and equitable test was an
affirmative federal policy.
2. Limits on the Compensation of Promoters and
Underwriters
Merit regulation frequently limits the entrepreneurial profit
that insiders, underwriters, and other promoters can make. This
may be accomplished by restricting the sale of stock to insiders
within a three year (or other) period prior to the public offering
at a price lower than the public offering price;," requiring that
48 Generally the disparity between the public price of stock and the price at which
insiders or promoters can buy the stock must be limited to 33 1,1 %. ABA Report, supra
note 1, at 811. This may contribute to the questionable underpricing of new issues by
underwriters. See Brandi, supra note 2, at 697.
49 E.g., ALABAmA SECUmTmS RuLE § 830-X-4.08, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 1 7448,
at 3415-16; FLORIDA SECURITIES RULE 3E-700.15(2)(b), 1A BLUE SKY L. Rnp. (CCH) 1
17,485, at 13,433.
0See In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648 (1945). In this case the Commis-
sion stated-
In contrast to some of the State officials and commissions, operating under
state "Blue Sky" laws that authorize them to pass upon the merits of securities
registered with them, it is not this Commission's function under the Securities
Act to approve or disapprove securities and the statute specifically makes it
unlawful to represent that the Commission has passed upon the merits of any
security, or given approval to it.
Id. at 656 (footnotes omitted).
81 E.g., ARKANsAs SECURrIES RuLE 11.02, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 10,472, at
6427-28; IowA SEcURrxEs RULE § 510-50.37(502), 1A BLUE SKY L REP. (CCH) 1 25,437,
at 20,416-17; OKLA. SEC. ComL. ADmUN. Rule R-305(g), 2 BLUE SKY L REP. (CCH) I
46,408B, at 41,518-19; TEX. ADmiN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3(3) and (5), 3 BLUE SKY L. RE.
(CCH) 55,583, at 49,520-21. See NASAA Statement of Policy, Cheap Stoch, NASAA
Reports (CCH) 802, at 601 (Adopted Apr. 23, 1983).
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promoters invest a minimum proportion of the company's total
equity capital;52 or limiting options and warrants available to
promoters to a "reasonable amount. '5 8 If an issuer does not
meet applicable standards, it must restructure its capitalization
in order to tap the capital market in a merit state.
The rationale for such limitations are rarely articulated be-
yond a reference to the prevention of fraud and overreaching.'
Yet, such profit regulation necessarily must rest on a theory of
fiduciary duty. At the federal level, limitations on the use of
cheap stock, options, and warrants as a means of compensating
underwriters are established by the NASD pursuant to its Rules
of Fair Practice.
The NASD reviews offerings to determine whether these
underwriting agreements are fair and reasonable in the same
fashion as a merit regulator reviews offerings. Generally, the
NASD will examine the size of the offering; the type of under-
writing commitment; the type of securities being offered; the ex-
istence of restrictions, or lack of them, on stock, warrants, op-
tions, or convertible securities received in connection with the
offering by the underwriters or related persons; the amount of
such stock, warrants, options, or convertible securities; the na-
ture and amount of overall compensation received by the under-
writer; the underwriter's relationship to the issuer; and evidence
of arm's length bargaining and conflicts of interest. All the cir-
cumstances surrounding the offering during the twelve-month
period prior to filing the registration statement are examined.
Normally, any purchases made within six months are considered
part of the underwriter's compensation. The transferability or
assignment of the stock, options, or warrants is restricted by the
NASD for a minimum period of one year from the effective date
of the registration statement. A limitation also exists on the
amount of stock, warrants, or options that can be received by an
82 E.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE, tit. 3, § 3 AAC 08.170(a) (Feb. 1972), 1 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 8430, at 4425; ARIZONA SECURTIES Rule 14-4-107, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 9517, at 5407-3; ARKANSAS Rule 12.04, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 10,484, at
6431-32. See NASAA Statement of Policy, Promoters' Investment, NASAA Reports
(CCH) 3202, at 1801 (Proposed).
53 CALIF. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, Rule 260.140.21, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 11,872,
at 7466-67. See NASAA Statement of Policy, Options and Warrants, NASAA Reports
(CCH) 1 2810, at 1601 (Adopted Sept. 17, 1980).
54 See, e.g., H. SOWARDS AND N. HIRSCH, supra note 45, at § 7A.03.
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underwriter in connection with an offering. In a firm commit-
ment underwriting, the maximum amount cannot exceed ten
percent of the total number of shares being offered to the public.
In a best efforts underwriting, the underwriter usually cannot
receive more than one share for every ten shares actually sold. If
a purchase or receipt of securities is found to be excessive, the
securities must be returned to the issuing company at their orig-
inal cost or the distribution will be considered unreasonable and
unfair. Where a potential conflict of interest or lack of arm's
length bargaining exists, a change in the underwriter may be
required.55
Some state merit standards are more rigorous than the
NASD's standards; some are less rigorous. However, the dispar-
ity in standards is due to historical accident. If some price regu-
lation of promoters and underwriters compensation is necessary
and appropriate for the protection of investors - and the per-
sistence of both national and state regulations to this effect
would indicate this may be the case - a uniform national stan-
dard could and should be established. A rule-making proceeding
by the SEC to develop a rule under the Exchange Act to address
this problem could serve to focus the debate between opponents
and proponents of merit regulation so that whatever features of
merit regulation appear to be essential to capital formation can
be made a part of a uniform standard.
The basic conflict between the full disclosure philosophy of
the federal securities laws and the philosophy of substantive re-
view of the fairness of an offering of state merit statutes may not
have been so apparent in a period when the SEC was engaged in
consumer-oriented investor protection. However, the policies of
the current SEC, which have encouraged greater efficiency in the
capital-raising process - through such deregulatory measures as
integrated disclosure and shelf registration - may more obvi-
ously come into conflict with the substantive blue-sky review of
offerings. Further, the shift in SEC policy is at least in part a
response to the institutionalization of the securities markets.=0
5Review of Corporate Financing, Interpretations of the Board of Governors Relat-
ing to Section 1 of Article HI of the Rules of Fair Practice, NASD Manual (CCH) 1
21,51.02, at 2019.
"See generally Karmel, Assessment of Shelf Registration: How Much Diligence is
Due Investors?, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 401 (1986).
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Because state regulation has not similarly adapted to changes in
the investor population which call into question the consumer
protection aspects of merit regulation, conflicts between federal
and state law have become more apparent.
In view of the improvements in corporate disclosure and ac-
counting and auditing standards which fifty years of federal se-
curities regulation has accomplished, and the vastly improved
communications systems utilized by today's investors, it is ques-
tionable whether there is any continuing policy justification for
permitting a state blue-sky administrator to stop any securities
offering that has been registered with the SEC from going for-
ward in a particular state. This is a barrier to capital formation
that does not appear justified by whatever additional investor
protection may be provided.5 7 Further, the parochial interest of
a single state in protecting its residents from purchasing shares
in an interstate offering subject to the full disclosure require-
ments of the Securities Act would not seem to outweigh the con-
comitant burden on commerce.
B. Internationalization
One of the reasons that the Commission should make a
greater effort to work either for the abolition of state merit regu-
lation or to incorporate any needed features of such regulation
into a national standard is that the securities markets are now
international. The only open question is the extent to which
United States corporations, investment banks, and investors will
participate in those markets. Because of the recognized present
and future importance of multinational securities offerings, the
SEC has issued a concept release requesting comments on the
implementation of a framework to accommodate multinational
securities offerings.58 SEC action to facilitate multinational se-
curities offerings is a worthwhile and needed endeavor. However,
implementation of the ideas set forth in the SEC's release re-
questing comment on this subject could be impeded by the con-
tinued existence of blue-sky merit regulation.
" Merit regulation does not protect investors against frauds perpetrated by those
who flout the law. Improved state enforcement action against confidence men would be a
better mechanism for separating dishonest from honest businessmen.
" Securities Act Rel. No. 33-6568 (Feb. 28, 1985), reprinted in 17 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 10 (Mar. 8, 1985).
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Some commentators have recommended a shift to a system
of comity, in which compliance with foreign securities disclosure
and accounting standards will be recognized and accepted for
the registration of foreign securities offerings in the United
States, at least as to issuers of those countries that have disclos-
ure and accounting standards comparable to those of the United
States.5 9 Others have suggested the drafting of common prospec-
tus-disclosure requirements.6 0 The ability of individual state
blue-sky commissioners to insist upon different standards would
render a determination by the SEC to adopt either type of pro-
gram meaningless.6 1 Furthermore, the necessity for complying
with blue-sky laws by foreign issuers who are unfamiliar with
United States law may be even more costly and burdensome
than it is to corporations in the United States. It is easy to take
the position that if a foreign issuer wishes to tap the capital
markets in the United States, it has to do so according to our
rules. However, such a position is myopic and self defeating. It
merely prevents United States investors from buying such secur-
ities through investment bankers in the United States and en-
courages the further development of an off-shore international
marketplace subject to little, if any, regulation by the United
States.
C. Blue Chip Exemptions
Most state securities laws currently provide an exemption
from their securities registration requirements to issuers that list
on a national securities exchange. Some states also provide an
exemption for certain over-the-counter securities.0 2 Controversy
over these exemptions has been caused by two different
developments.
On the one hand, the NASD has been urging that the states
adopt broader exemptions so that securities listed on NASDAQ
" See Division of Corporation Finance, Summary of Comments on Concept Re-
lease Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, Jan. 10, 1986.
eO Id.
" Massachusetts and the NASAA submitted comments cautioning that a reciprocal
approach could lead to both merit and disclosure review of foreign offerings by the
states. Id. at 52-53. See also Letter from Michael Unger to John Wheeler, Aug. 16, 1985,
NASAA Reports (CCH) 9303, at 9210.
e See note 30 supra.
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and/or securities designated as "NMS securities" 3 become ex-
empt from blue-sky registration requirements. On the other
hand, the NYSE has decided to revise its listing requirements,
which presently prohibit dual class capitalizations that result in
non-voting or restricted voting stock. 4 While the SEC has not
yet approved such a change, the pendency of this probable rule
change has caused some blue-sky regulators to consider elimina-
tion of the blue chip exemption in view of merit standards ad-
dressed to voting rights.
Blue-sky provisions dealing with shareholder voting rights
generally are promulgated under a fair and equitable standard.
Such restrictions are intended to keep promoters from obtaining
public financing without relinquishing some company control to
the public.6 5 The states that have rules mandating such rights
seek to provide equity between classes of stock, although prefer-
ential rights to either dividends or distributions on liquidation
may provide the necessary justification for unequal voting rights.
Annexed as Table II is a chart setting forth the states that have
merit restrictions relating to voting rights.
A North American Securities Administrators Association
(NASAA) Statement of Policy on Non-Voting Stock states that
unless preferential treatment as to dividends and liquidation is
provided with respect to the publicly offered security or the dif-
ferentiation is otherwise justified, the offering or proposed offer-
ing of equity securities of an issuer having more than one class
of equity security authorized or outstanding shall be considered
unfair and inequitable to public investors if the class of equity
securities offered to the public (a) has no voting rights or (b) has
less than equal voting rights, in proportion to the number of
shares of each class outstanding, on all matters, including the
election of members to the board of directors of the issuer."0
This type of merit review has been adopted in Alaska, Indiana,
'3 See 17 CYR. § 240.11Aa2-1 (1986) (defining "national market system securities").
" See Karmel, supra note 31, at 1, and Dent, supra note 40; Seligman, supra note
40. See also Karmel, Is One Share, One Vote Archaic?, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26, 1985, at 1, col.
1.
1" Brandi, supra note 2, at 700; H. SOWARDS AND N. HIRSCH, supra note 45, at §
7A.03[h][ii].
08 NASAA Statement of Policy, Non-Voting Stock, NASAA Reports (CCH) 1 2401,
at 1401 (Adopted Sept. 17, 1980).
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Missouri, and Nebraska.67
In January 1986, the NASAA Committee on State Registra-
tion Exemptions issued a Report and Recommendation on the
issues of an NMS exemption, an exchange exemption, and other
matters."' This report subsequently was approved by NASAA at
its spring meeting.69 In the context of current controversies over
possible changes in listing standards relating to voting rights
and any expansion of the blue chip exemption, the NASAA
Committee Report recommended that instead of a blue chip ex-
emption specifying, for example, NYSE securities, the blue-sky
commissioner should designate the criteria for any blue chip ex-
emption in a rule. Thus, state administrators would have the
power to certify appropriate blue chip standards, rather than
delegating their ability to set criteria to an SRO. Further, the
proposed model rule would require exempt issuers, among other
7 ALASKA ADMmN. CODE tit. 3, § 3AAC 08.210, 1 BLUE SKY L REP. (CCH) 2 8434, at
4428; INDIANA ADmN. CODE § 71OIAC, 1-12-4, 1A BLUE SKY L REP. (CCH) 1 24,590, at
19,463; Mo. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 30-52.110, 2 BLUE SKY L REP. (CCH) 2 35,461, at
30,532; NEB. SECUrnES RULES, tit. 48, Ch. 8, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 37,403, at
32,505-06.
The Minnesota regulations, INN. H. 2875.3080, 1A BLuE SKY L REP. (CCH) 2
33,501, at 28,436, go one step further to say there will be no registration of securiies with
unequal voting rights unless the Commissioner, in his discretion, deems such substitutes
satisfactory. Similarly, Texas and Wyoming permit the Commissioner to determine that
the preferential treatment justifies unequal voting rights. TX. ADL COD- tit. 7, §
113.3(6), 3 BLUE SKY L REP. (CCH) S 55,583, at 49,521; Wyo. SEcunMxS RutE § 30j), 3
BLUE SKy L. REP. (CCH) 9 66,433, at 57,507. Two alternativs to the stringent voting
rights requirement are provided in TENN. CODE ANN. 0780-4-3.06(4)(i), 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) T 54,426, at 48,513. In addition to preferential treatment as to dividends and
liquidation, it allows unequal voting rights if a public market exists for the issuers
securities.
Another slight modification to the NASAA statement exists in the Ws. AD,.nn.
CODE, § SEC 3.07(1), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) T 64,527, at 56,520-21. Whereas the
NASAA statement provides that the offering shall be deemed unfair and inequitable if
voting rights are unequal and preferential treatment is absent, the Wisconsin statute
states that the offering may be deemed unfair and inequitable if common stock has no
voting rights. Less than equal voting rights may be justified by preferential treatment.
Other merit statutes classify equity securities into preferred and common stock cate-
gories. See, e.g., CAr. ADmiN. CODE, tit. 10 § 260.140.1, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1
11,852, at 7,664; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § C-08 (West 1973), 1A BLUE SKY L. RaP. (CCH) 2
28,498 at 23, 428-29; MwN. R Parts 2875.3080, 2875.3510 (1983), 1A BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) It 33,501, at 28,436, 33,508, at 28,437; WAsms ADIt. CODE §§ 460-16A-035, 460-
16A-040, 3 BLE SKY L REP. (CCH) T 61,647, at 54,503, and S 61,548, at 54,503-53,504.
e NASAA Committee Report on State Registration Exemptions, reprinted in 18
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 206 (Feb. 7, 1986).
e9 NASAA Agrees to Propose Amendments to '56 Uniform Act at Spring Afeeting,
reprinted in 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 399 (Mar. 21, 1986).
1987]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
things, to have at least two independent directors, an audit com-
mittee composed solely of independent directors, and no class of
nonvoting common stock. If two classes of voting stock are out-
standing, the class with the lesser voting rights would be re-
quired to have the right to elect at least twenty-five percent of
the directors of the issuer. Further, the voting disparity between
the classes could be no greater than 10 to 1. Voting rights for
preferred stockholders also are specified in the proposal.
Some commentators believe that the trend toward issuance
of non-voting common stock could have a deleterious effect in
the long term on capital formation. First, it could impair inves-
tor confidence in the securities markets and more generally in
business corporations. Second, it could eliminate an important
accountability mechanism, which enables large public corpora-
tions to avoid further government regulation."0 Yet, because the
stock exchanges and the over-the-counter market are competing
marketplaces, it is not realistic to expect one exchange faced
with the possibility of widespread delistings to uphold ideal
standards. Further, the trends in the direction of non-voting
stock are a reaction to perceived abuses in the so-called market
for corporate control.
This makes it likely that the SEC ultimately will be forced
to intervene in imposing a national standard with regard to vot-
ing rights on publicly traded corporations. The SEC cannot
credibly maintain that the states should maintain and even ex-
pand the blue chip exemption if it is not ready to afford share-
holders and investors some basic protections with regard to cor-
porate governance. The alternative is greatly increased merit
review of securities offerings, which would be a big step in the
wrong direction.
CONCLUSION
The balance between SEC, SRO, and state regulatory re-
quirements for securities issuances has always been complex and
tenuous. This article has addressed only some of the emerging
controversies that threaten to upset the existing balance and re-
quire the development of a new relationship between the SEC,
70 See, e.g., Seligman, The One Share, One Vote Controversy, Report prepared for
Investor Responsibility Research Center Inc., Jan. 1986, at 19-22.
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the SROs, and the states in order to establish necessary and ap-
propriate investor protection standards in connection with se-
curities flotations. As so often is the case, the marketplace is
moving much faster than the regulators in establishing a new
order.
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